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THE FUTURE OF THE SAFE RULE
AND ACHIEVING MORE CLIMATEFRIENDLY CAFE REGULATIONS
MAXIMO LACERCA-DESROSIERS1

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 2020, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) issued a final rule called the “Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles
Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger and Light Trucks” (“SAFE
Rule”) to amend the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) ratings.2 CAFE standards are regulations first enacted nearly fifty years
ago to promote greater fuel efficiency in car manufacturing through a
system of incentives and penalties.3 While the CAFE standards have
been revised many times over the years, the SAFE Rule rolled back the
more stringent 2012 CAFE standards that sought to align fuel efficiency
with broader strategies to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to
address global climate change.4 Now that President Biden has taken office, the SAFE Rule is undergoing review, which may result in a return
to more stringent standards.5 However, even with a regulatory fix, the
1
Maximo Lacerca-Desrosiers is a second-year law student at Golden Gate University School
of Law, graduating in May 2022. Prior to pursing a Juris Doctor degree, Maximo studied business,
with a focus on global operations management, at San Jose State University.
2
The Safer Affordable Fuel Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (April 30, 2020) [hereinafter SAFE Vehicles
Rule].
3
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A Brief History of US Fuel Efficiency Standards (Dec.
6, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency.
4
2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 CAFE
Standards].
5
See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review (Jan.
20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheetlist-of-agency-actions-for-review/.
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use of CAFE standards to combat climate change is likely to remain
problematic.
The impact of the CAFE standards relates to how they work. In a
nutshell, CAFE standards regulate vehicle manufacturers based on the
average fuel economy of the entire fleet of vehicles they produce in a
given year rather than regulating individual cars or even specific models.6 As long as the average fuel efficiency of a car manufacturer’s fleet
(as weighted by sales in a given year) meets the CAFE standards, the
manufacturer is deemed compliant.7 If the average fuel efficiency of the
fleet exceeds the standard, the offending manufacturer must pay a penalty proportionate to its divergence from the standard.8 While this
description omits much of the nuance that makes the standards complex,
it is sufficient to convey a basic understanding of how the regulatory
scheme uses incentives and penalties to influence the automobile industry to improve fuel efficiency.
The CAFE regulations also have profound secondary impacts, beyond just fuel economy.9 For example, more stringent standards can
speed up the rate of technological innovation by incentivizing greater
investment in research and development of green technologies.10 This in
turn can reduce GHG emissions and reduce consumer demand for oil and
gas.11 Additionally, changing technologies can also affect the number
and types of jobs in the automotive industry. Due to the far-reaching
consequences of the regulation, it is important to understand why CAFE
was enacted and how specific standards like those in the new SAFE Rule
are likely to influence the complex nexus of CAFE objectives and secondary outcomes.
The SAFE Rule is controversial for a variety of reasons.12 First, the
SAFE Rule proposed to weaken the standards and reduce vehicle fuel
economy, based on the rationale that the previous rule had set the maxi6

SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,181.
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 3.
8
NHTSA, Corporate Average Fuel Economy, https://www.nhtsa.gov/laws-regulations/corporate-average-fuel-economy (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).
9
Kenneth Small, The Elusive effects of CAFE standard, SCIENCE DIRECT, (2018) https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128126202000110.
10
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards (Aug. 11,
2014), https://www.transportation.gov/mission/sustainability/corporate-average-fuel-economy-cafestandards (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).
11
Id.
12
See Benjamin J. Hulac & Jessica Wehrman, Final Rule on Fuel Economy Rollback Opens
Door for Lawsuits, ROLL CALL (Mar. 31, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/03/31/final
-rule-on-fuel-economy-rollback-opens-door-for-lawsuits/; Julia Stein, Still Not SAFE, LEGAL
PLANET (Mar. 28, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/03/28/still-not-safe/.
7
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mum feasible standards too high for car manufacturers to meet.13 The
SAFE Rule also eliminated a longstanding waiver program under the
Clean Air Act that had authorized California to establish more stringent
standards that other states could adopt as an alternative to the federal
standards.14
The rule can also be seen as a politically motivated move by the
Trump administration to undo a key policy of the Obama administration
and to pander to the political influence of the fossil fuel industry. The
2012 CAFE standards were one of President Trump’s first targets for
deregulation when he took office. On March 22, 2017, newly appointed
EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt and Secretary of Transportation Elaine
Chao issued a public notice that the EPA would re-examine its Mid-term
Determination concerning the continued adequacy of the 2012 standards
because NHTSA had not completed its evaluation.15 After a notice and
comment period, the EPA formally withdrew the previous Mid-term Determination in April 2018, stating that the 2012 standards had been based
on “outdated information” and were “not appropriate.”16 The controversial move to suddenly switch course on CAFE under the auspices of a
president who openly challenged the validity of climate change sent
shockwaves through the environmental community.17
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that introduced SAFE in August 2018 received more than 750,000 public comments—more comments than any other vehicle emissions rule had ever received.18 One of
the key reasons that the proposal received so much attention was that it
announced a plan to freeze the CAFE ratings for model years 2021-2026,
allowing car manufacturers to remain at current levels of average fuel
efficiency indefinitely.19 Not only was this a significant departure from
13
Proposed Rule, SAFE Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026, 835 Fed. Reg. 42,986,
42,990-91 [hereinafter Proposed SAFE Vehicles Rule]; SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW,
Five Important Points About the EPA’s “SAFE Vehicle Rule,” EARTH INSTITUTE (August 7, 2018),
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/08/07/five-points-epa-safe-vehicle-rule/.
14
The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 [hereinafter One National Program Rule].
15
Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-term Evaluation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg.
14,671 (March 22, 2017). The original Mid-Term Evaluation was finalized on January 12, 2017, just
before President Obama left office, after EPA completed an extensive technical report that included
a notice and comment period. California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
16
Withdrawal Notice, Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077.
17
Hulac & Wehrman, supra note 12; Miranda Green, EPA submits final controversial car
emissions rule to the White House, THE HILL (Aug. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/456206-epa-submits-final-controversial-car-emissions-rule-to-the-white.
18
SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,181.
19
Proposed SAFE Vehicles Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 42,988.
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the previous CAFE standards that aimed to increase vehicle fuel efficiency, it also obstructed efforts to address climate change by reducing
GHG emissions from vehicles.20 The final rule, however, did not include
this controversial CAFE freeze but instead required a modest annual increase of 1.5 mpg, a figure the NHTSA and EPA claimed was much
more reasonable than the previous standards.21
While frustrating, it is possible that this move by the EPA and
NHTSA is completely legal. A recent case challenging the withdrawal
of the Mid-term Determination, California v. EPA, was dismissed by the
D.C. Circuit because it determined that the withdrawal was not a final
agency action and thus not ripe for judicial review.22 The EPA’s decision to withdraw its prior “final” determination did not set new standards
but simply reopened the analysis to determine what the EPA deemed
would be more appropriate CAFE standards.23 Meanwhile, the guidelines that the NHTSA follows when determining CAFE standards are
defined by statute,24 and nothing directs the agency to consider environmental impacts as a primary factor in its analysis. Additional legal challenges are ongoing and it remains to be seen whether the current SAFE
standards will be set aside or upheld.25
With President Biden in office, a future where SAFE remains in
place seems increasingly unlikely. Recently, President Biden announced
that his administration will look into replacing SAFE.26 However, until
the administration takes action, the SAFE Rule will remain in place.
Whether car manufacturers will take advantage of this and slow their
efforts to improve vehicle efficiency remains unknown, but the rate at
which fossil fuels are consumed could easily see an uptick as compared
to projections under the Obama CAFE standards.27 Although this might
pose less of a problem if the states were still allowed to set their own,
more-stringent fuel economy and emissions standards, the SAFE Rule
expressly preempts state standards and rescinds California’s Clean Air
Act waiver28—a waiver that allowed California to set stronger standards
20

SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, supra note 13.
SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,188.
22
California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
23
Id.
24
49 U.S.C. § 32902.
25
E.g., Petition for Review, Union of Concerned Scientists et al. v. NTHSA, Case No. 191230 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2019).
26
Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Stephan Lee, EPA Chief Vows Tougher Tailpipes Rules by July,
Unwinding Trumps, BLOOMBERG LAW (April 6, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/epa-chief-vows-tougher-tailpipe-rules-by-july-unwinding-trumps.
27
SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, supra note 13.
28
One National Program Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310.
21
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that other states could then adopt.29 While the new EPA can perhaps
change the rules and re-issue that waiver, there is no guarantee that it will
last under a different presidential administration. For these reasons, the
future of SAFE has far broader implications than whether cars will be
more fuel-efficient in the years to come.
This comment will explore the history of the CAFE standards and
the SAFE Rule as they relate to efforts to promote fuel efficient vehicles
and reduce GHG emissions. This begins with a brief overview of the
CAFE standards, including the roles of the EPA and the NHTSA in administering the standards, why the CAFE standards were created, and
how this relates to the regulation of GHG emissions to address climate
change. Next, this comment will evaluate how past legal challenges
have influenced the CAFE regulations and how the SAFE Rule fits into
the resulting regulatory and legal framework. Finally, this comment will
discuss how the Biden administration can respond to the SAFE Rule, and
what this might mean for the future of fuel-efficient vehicles and the
increasingly urgent need to reduce GHG emissions to address climate
change.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the implications and legality of the SAFE
Rule, some background on the origin and purpose of the CAFE program
is necessary. This section will explore the distinct mandates of the two
federal agencies responsible for the program, how this relates to the government’s stance on climate change, and how the CAFE standards have
changed during the four decades since their creation. This section will
also explore the history of the Clean Air Act waiver and the origins of
the new One National Program introduced by the SAFE Rule.
A. THE EPA, NHTSA, AND
ON CLIMATE CHANGE

THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S STANCE

The story of the CAFE standards begins with an explanation of how
the program came to be administered by two distinct agencies with very
different mandates. The program has gradually changed over the years
as new administrations updated the regulations, and in response to legal
challenges and new laws enacted by Congress.
29
U.S. EPA, Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, https://www.epa.gov/
state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations (last visited
Apr. 6, 2021).
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1. EPA Origins
The EPA was created in 1970 with the purpose of establishing a
federal agency dedicated to taking on the federal government’s environmental responsibilities.30 This initiated a new era of government regulation aimed at protecting the environment. With the passage of the Clean
Air Act of 1970, Congress directed the EPA “to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”31 This gave
the agency power to regulate and prevent air pollution. Initially, the
Clean Air Act’s regulation of vehicle emissions was more limited in
scope and covered only some of the air pollutants that are now recognized as harmful.32 But the Act’s expansive mandate also empowered
the EPA Administrator to revise the standards “from time to time” to
address such additional pollutants and types of vehicles “which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”33 The Act also defined
key elements of the regulatory structure that would be incorporated into
the future CAFE standards.34 This regulatory structure would change
somewhat in the decades that followed as a result of amendments, court
decisions, new research, and changing conditions that gradually expanded the scope of the Act.35
Under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator is required to regulate and prescribe standards for any “air pollutant”
from motor vehicles.36 According to the Act, an air pollutant is “any
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or material
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”37 Additionally, section 209 of the Clean Air Act permits the EPA to grant waivers
authorizing states whose regulatory programs predated the act to continue setting their own standards.38 The only state that qualified was
30
President Richard Nixon, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (July 9, 1970); William D.
Ruckelshaus, Initial Organization of the EPA, EPA Order 1110.2, (Dec. 4, 1970).
31
Clean Air Amendments (Clean Air Act) of 1970 § 101(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7590).
32
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b).
33
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
34
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (e.g., regulating manufacturers’ fleet-wide averages for model years).
35
E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments, Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (expanding requirements for new vehicles and promoting use of cleaner fuels).
36
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
37
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
38
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
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California,39 which in 1966 had established the nation’s first program to
regulate tailpipe emissions.40
Until the late 1990s, regulation of vehicle emissions was primarily
concerned with reducing smog, acid rain, and toxic pollution from leaded
gasoline and other chemical additives.41 This changed in the wake of the
1997 Kyoto Protocol, which brought widespread attention to the role of
increasing GHG emissions as a key driver of climate change.42 Then a
dispute arose over whether GHG emissions constituted an air pollutant
under the Clean Air Act.43 The issue came to a head in 2007 with Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Court found that GHG emissions did meet
the definition of an air pollutant as defined by the Clean Air Act, and that
the EPA was therefore obligated to establish appropriate regulations to
prevent harm to the public welfare.44 As a result of Massachusetts v.
EPA, the EPA became more involved in regulating the GHG released by
tailpipe emissions.
2. NHTSA Origins
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration was
established in 1970 for the purpose of ensuring vehicle safety on the
nation’s highways.45 Housed within the Department of Transportation
(“DOT”), NHTSA’s first order of business was investigating safety defects in motor vehicles.46 Over time, NHTSA’s duties expanded as the
DOT delegated additional responsibilities, including the CAFE program,
to its subagency.47
The CAFE program was created in 1975 by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (“EPCA”)48 “to provide for improved energy efficiency of motor vehicles.”49 As discussed below, the purpose of the legislation was to promote increased vehicle fuel efficiency as a means to
39

See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, History, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history (last
visited Apr. 9, 2021).
41
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY
526 (8th ed. 2018).
42
Id. at 531-32.
43
Id.
44
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007).
45
Highway Safety Act of 1970 § 201(a), Pub. L. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1740 (codified at 23 U.S.C.
§§ 401-412).
46
NHTSA, A Drive Through Time, https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/timeline/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
47
Id.
48
42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422; Energy Policy Conservation Act (EPCA) §§ 501-503, Pub. L. 94163, 89 Stat. 872 (Dec. 22, 1975).
49
42 U.S.C. § 6201(5).
40
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prevent gas shortages.50 Pursuant to EPCA, the Department of Transportation, through NHTSA, is responsible for determining the “maximum
feasible” standards for CAFE as part of its effort to establish a regulatory
“floor.”51 This simply means that the federal government sets the minimum bar that vehicle manufacturers must meet, but requires this target to
be feasible.52 DOT delegates this responsibility to NHTSA,53 which is
required by statute to consider four specific factors when making CAFE
determinations:
[The Agency] shall consider [1] technological feasibility, [2] economic practicability, [3] the effect of other motor vehicle standards of
the Government on fuel economy, and [4] the need of the United
States to conserve energy.54

Notably, environmental protection is not among the factors that Congress
enumerated for consideration in setting CAFE standards. This is also
evident in the text of the SAFE Rule, which states that the new rules
“represent a reasonable balance . . . given the foreseeable state of the
global oil market and minimal effect on the climate between finalizing
[the implemented standard] versus more stringent standards.”55
In short, CAFE standards were never about protecting the environment—they were about protecting the U.S. from facing additional fuel
shortages. This directive expanded over time as CAFE has evolved into
a more complex regulatory scheme, but the language found in the SAFE
Rule indicates where NHTSA’s mission really lies. Although EPA has a
duty to regulate GHG emissions pursuant to Massachusetts v. EPA, this
duty is not shared by NHTSA and not encompassed by the scope of the
CAFE regulatory scheme.
3. Federal Climate Change Policies
Unlike gas shortages and exhaust fumes, the issue of climate change
did not emerge as a matter of broad public concern until the late 1980s.56
And even then, policy emerged slowly in an era of increasingly divisive
50

See discussion infra at section II. B.
49 U.S.C. § 32902(a).
52
Baruch Feigenbaum & Julian Morris, CAFE Standards in Plain English, REASON (Jan. 13,
2017), https://reason.org/e-brief/cafe-standards-in-plain-english/.
53
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 10.
54
49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).
55
SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,176.
56
Patrick J. Egan & Megan Mullin, Climate Change: US Public Opinion, 20 ANN. REV. POL.
SCIENCE 209, 210-11 (May 2017), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051215-022857.
51
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politics and growing backlash against environmental regulations.57
These historical factors have continued to influence the federal response
to climate change, which helps explain the government’s stance on climate change.58
While the majority of people in the U.S. recognize climate change
as an important issue, there remains a significant number of Americans
who deny the veracity of climate change science for various reasons.59
Despite a broad scientific consensus on the facts and causes of climate
change, as well as the urgently increasing risks from the effects of climate change, some have refused to recognize this critical issue. Science
aside, the government’s position has been deeply influenced by partisan
politics and resistance of different kinds, depending on the political
makeup of Congress and the sitting president.60 Notably, the fossil fuel
industry has helped fuel doubts and encouraged politicians to resist taking action that could limit extraction and consumption of fossil fuels.61
Scientists have reported a steady rise in the average temperature of
the earth for decades.62 For example, a study released by the National
Academy of Sciences in North America in 2006 showed that the average
global surface temperature of the earth increased by one degree Celsius
in the last 150 years,63 which, if continued, would lead to catastrophic
consequences unless the leading countries in the world were to undertake
immediate action. A decade later, 196 countries stepped up to the challenge by signing onto the “Paris Agreement,” an international treaty
aimed at coordinating GHG emissions reductions across every continent
in an effort to stabilize the climate.64
In short, the EPA and NHTSA each have independent reasons to
regulate tailpipe emissions that originated long before the Trump administration. After GHG emissions were recognized as an air pollutant, the
EPA had its own reasons for increasing fuel efficiency that were not
57

Id. at 217-18, 221.
Percival, Robert V., Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, UNIV.
CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 164-65 (1997).
59
Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change and the Environment in
7 Charts, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/21/
how-americans-see-climate-change-and-the-environment-in-7-charts/.
60
Egan & Mullin, supra note 56, at 219-20.
61
Emily Holden, How the oil industry has spent billions to control the climate change conversation, GUARDIAN, (Jan. 8, 2020). https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/08/oil-companies-climate-crisis-pr-spending.
62
James Hansen et. al., Global temperature change, 103 PNAS 14288-93 (2006), https://
www.pnas.org/content/103/39/14288.short.
63
Id.
64
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
58
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encompassed by the purpose of the CAFE program. Additionally, the
government’s stance on climate change has been strongly influenced by
political divisions. Understanding these agencies and the government’s
stance helps us better understand how SAFE came to be.
B. A BRIEF HISTORY

OF THE

CAFE STANDARDS

As noted above, the CAFE standards were originally a Congressional response to a severe gas shortage that brought the U.S. economy to
a standstill in the 1970s. Midway through the fall of 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) placed an embargo on
oil exports to the United States and other allies.65 This embargo on oil
was the first of several in the years to come, and it fundamentally
changed the landscape of the global economy in both the short and long
term.66 The embargo caused the price of oil to quadruple within a year
and led to acute gasoline shortages.67 In many places, rationing was introduced that limited drivers to odd or even days (depending on the last
digit of their license plate) as the only days that they could pump gas.68
Lines around the corner were not uncommon, and many gas stations began the practice of flying green, yellow, or red flags to broadcast the
corresponding amount of gasoline they had left.69 Gas was so difficult to
come by that a national speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour was established in an attempt to conserve precious fuel.70
In the wake of the crisis there was a broad national demand for the
federal government to take action to prevent another dire episode.71 This
was also a period of environmental concern and tolerance for increased
regulation to protect shared resources and public health.72 These factors
set the stage for national legislation to address the crisis.
As noted above, the CAFE standards were created by Congress
when it enacted EPCA in 1975 with the primary goal to improve fuel
65

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 3.
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Oil Embargo, 1973-1974, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
67
Michael Corbett, Oil Shock of 1973-74, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY, https://www.federal
reservehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1973-74.
68
Greg Myre, Gas Lines Evoke Memories of Oil Crises in the 1970s, NPR (Nov. 10, 2012,
5:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2012/11/10/164792293/gas-lines-evoke-memories-oil-crises-in-the-1970s.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, supra note 66.
72
Percival, Robert V., Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, UNIV.
CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 164-65 (1997).
66
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efficiency to prevent or ameliorate the risk of future acute shortages.73
The first standards, implemented in 1978, placed requirements on passenger vehicles and light trucks were included a year later.74 These
CAFE ratings were designed to act as a floor, establishing the maximum
feasible threshold for car manufacturers, but otherwise allowing more
fuel-efficient vehicles to be sold in the U.S.75
The first decade of the program saw a steady improvement in CAFE
ratings until 1986, when minimum CAFE requirements were frozen at 26
miles per gallon.76 They were then improved to 27.5 miles per gallon
four years later in 1990 during the first Bush administration.77 However,
the CAFE requirements would remain dormant at this level for the next
twenty years during both the Clinton and Bush II administrations.78
While the standards were still reviewed from time to time, there was no
requirement to change them unless the NHTSA determined new standards were needed.79
In 2006, the NHTSA issued new standards that introduced the concept of a vehicle footprint to adjust standards for different size categories
of vehicles.80 These regulations were ultimately set aside for procedural
reasons as the result of a legal challenge,81 but the new footprint approach would resurface in the next iteration.82 Meanwhile, in 2007, a
shift in the balance of Congress led to the passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act (“EISA”), which amended the CAFE program as part of a sweeping effort to promote renewable energy.83 This
was around the same time that Massachusetts v. EPA was decided, giving the EPA a new directive to regulate vehicle GHG emissions.84
Under EISA, the NHTSA was directed to consult with EPA and the De73

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 3.
Id.
75
SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,181.
76
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP,, Summary of Fuel Economy Performance (Dec. 15, 2014), https://
www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/performance-summary-report-12152014-v2.pdf.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg.
17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006).
81
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th
Cir. 2008) (finding NHTSA failed to conduct an adequate environmental analysis under the Nat’l
Env’t Policy Act (NEPA) and failed to comply with CAFE requirements at 49 USCS § 32902).
82
Average Fuel Economy Standards, Passenger Cars and Light Trucks; Model Years 20112015, 73 Fed. Reg. 24,351 (July 1, 2008).
83
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, 110 P.L. 140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001-17386 (2007)).
84
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007).
74
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partment of Energy when implementing new CAFE standards.85 This is
also when aligning agency goals to reduce the burden on vehicle manufacturers of having to follow multiple standards emerged as an issue.
In the meantime, opposition to CAFE regulations had begun to
grow during the 1980s and 1990s. Opponents worried that more-stringent standards would result in greater compliance costs, and those costs
would be defrayed to customers who would have to pay higher prices for
more fuel-efficient cars.86 Due to the nature of car manufacturing, any
type of regulation that aims to set rules for how cars can be produced
must give enough lead time for the car manufacturers to reasonably make
changes and achieve compliance. This means retooling factories and
sinking money into research and development in order to make more
fuel-efficient cars.87 Or it means producing fewer big cars that are less
fuel-efficient and a greater number of smaller cars that are more fuelefficient. Because new standards place a burden on the industry to adjust, new CAFE regulations must be published at least eighteen months
in advance of the affected model year to provide car manufacturers with
time to achieve compliance.88
During President Obama’s first year in office, he was tasked with
completing the Bush administration’s 2008 CAFE requirements, as well
as reconciling various problems that had arisen with the introduction of
the footprint model and the passage of EISA.89 Originally, CAFE ratings
were formulated using a simple mathematical equation,90 but with the
introduction of the footprint model with different standards for different
sizes of vehicles, calculating fuel efficiency became more complicated.91
There was also the issue of dealing with the three separate standards for
fuel emission regulation established by the EPA, the NHTSA, and the
state of California.92 Having three separate guidelines made compliance
and enforcement more difficult for agencies and car manufacturers.
In 2009, the Obama administration responded to these challenges by
announcing a new joint rulemaking that would seek to resolve many of
these issues. The EPA and NHTSA issued a Notice of Intent for an up85

EISA § 102 (b).
Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, Don’t Raise CAFE standards, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 1,
2007), https://www.cato.org/commentary/dont-raise-cafe-standards.
87
Feigenbaum & Morris, supra note 52.
88
49 U.S.C. § 32902(a).
89
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, 110 P.L. 140, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001-17386 (2007)).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
The Bush EPA had denied California’s request for a new waiver in 2005, but in 2009
Obama’s EPA granted the waiver. See Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
86
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coming joint rulemaking, by which the agencies would collaborate on the
next iteration of CAFE standards.93 This effort culminated in the 2010
CAFE standards, which represented a first attempt to integrate the regulation of fuel efficiency and GHG emissions in a single standard.94
These regulations also introduced a new national program to provide a
single set of standards that aligned state and federal regulations.95
In 2012, the Obama Administration further refined these standards.96 President Obama’s new guidelines for car manufacturers raised
the CAFE ratings from 27.5 miles per gallon to 38.5 miles per gallon
over the course of seven years.97 The 2012 rule also projected raising
fuel economy standards in phased increments through the year 2025 to as
high as 50 MPG and eliminated the need for compliance with three separate standards by negotiating a single national standard.98 It also reaffirmed California’s Clean Air Act waiver, allowing the state to create
more-stringent guidelines if it so desired.99 The 2012 standards were in
effect when President Trump took office in January 2017.
Early in 2017, the Trump administration began taking steps to reverse course and reduce the stringency of the Obama Era guidelines in an
effort to promote fuel consumption, protect jobs in the automotive industry, and ostensibly make cars “safer.”100 After declaring the intent to
freeze the 2012 Rule, President Trump announced the proposed SAFE
Rule for model years 2021-2026,101 which, as noted above, was highly
controversial. Litigation was initially focused on the rescission of the
Clean Air Act waivers, and then on the SAFE Rule once it was issued.
In light of the history of CAFE, it is easier to understand why the
EPA and NHTSA are jointly responsible for the SAFE Rule. Under
EISA the agencies were required to consult before NHTSA issued new
standards, which encouraged them to work together to release one rule
covering both agency mandates to make compliance less burdensome on
93
Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking To Establish Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE
Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,007 (May 22, 2009).
94
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
95
See 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,326-29.
96
2012 CAFE Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012).
97
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Administration Finalizes
Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 28, 2012), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/obama-administration-finalizes-historic545-mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-term Evaluation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg.
14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017).
101
Id.
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manufacturers. This would enable car manufacturers to meet the requirement for improving fuel economy and the requirement for reducing GHG
emissions through compliance with a single set of standards.102
C. ONE NATIONAL PROGRAM

AND

WAIVER

As mentioned earlier, the effort to align agency standards into a
single national program emerged after the enactment of EISA in 2007
and became an element of the Obama administration’s 2010 CAFE
Rule.103 Under the 2010 Rule and subsequent 2012 Rule, the alignment
of standards was negotiated between the agencies and several states that
had previously adopted more stringent standards.104 To understand how
the SAFE Rule impacts state standards requires understanding one more
chapter of CAFE history.
When the Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970, there was one state in
the union that had already developed its own air pollution regulatory program for tailpipe emissions – California. Under section 209 of the Clean
Air Act, the EPA can allow California to continue these independent
efforts so long as its standards are not weaker than the new federal standards.105 In addition, section 177 of the Act allows other states to adopt
California’s more stringent standards as an alternative to the federal
standards.106
Clean Air Act section 209 requires California to request a new
waiver each time it modifies its standards.107 Beginning in 2005, California undertook an ambitious effort to review all of its state programs to
develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to climate change.108 This
led the state to realize that vehicle emissions accounted for approximately forty percent of GHG emissions, which made reducing emissions
a major priority for the state.109 However, when the state applied for a
waiver from the Bush administration, it was denied.110 The state sued,
102

One National Program Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310.
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
104
2012 CAFE Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,624.
105
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
106
42 U.S.C. § 7507.
107
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
108
See California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (June 1, 2005); AB
32: The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. 2006 Cal. Stat. 488.
109
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
110
Id.
103
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but after Obama was elected, the EPA granted the waiver in 2009.111
This enabled other states to adopt California’s ambitious new standards.112 In 2011, California was granted another waiver to set its own
fuel economy and zero emission vehicle (ZEV) standards under the
Clean Air Act.113
In the meantime, California also began facing legal challenges by
parties opposed to “stricter” emissions regulations. For example, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene, car manufacturers sued the state
of California in an effort to repeal its more stringent standards, which
they feared would result in higher compliance costs and slimmer profit
margins.114 The car manufacturers argued unsuccessfully that California
was preempted from establishing its own standards under the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).115 The court disagreed, however,
holding that once a state had been granted a valid waiver by the EPA
Administrator, that state had the power to set its own vehicle emissions
standards.116 The court thus reaffirmed the proposition that California
and other states that adopt California’s standards had the legal authority
to issue their own vehicle emissions standards.117
However, the Trump EPA reversed course again and rescinded the
waiver as part of the new SAFE Rule. The One National Program, a
subrule within the SAFE Rule, expressly preempted California and section 177 states from setting their own standards.118 This purported to be
an effort to promote compliance with the SAFE Rule but was likely done
to enjoin states from setting more rigorous vehicle emissions standards.
This series of reversals highlights the precarious nature of Clean Air
Act waivers, by which state authority to regulate vehicle emissions is
subject to the discretion of the current EPA administrator. Without a
valid section 209 waiver, California cannot set its own vehicle emissions
standards, even when its standards would achieve greater fuel economy
111
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting
a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (July 8, 2009).
112
42 U.S.C. § 7507.
113
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Within the Scope Determination and Waiver of Preemption Decision for Amendments to California’s Zero-Emission Vehicle
(ZEV) Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 61095 (Oct. 3, 2011). .
114
Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
115
Energy Policy Conservation Act (EPCA) §§ 501-03, Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 872 (Dec.
22, 1975).
116
Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
117
Id.
118
One National Program Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,361-62 (codified at 49 C.F.R.
§ 531.7 and 49 C.F.R. pt. 531 app. B).
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than the federal standards.119 Without California standards, other states
have no alternative to the federal standards.120 This poses an obstacle for
states who are positioned and willing to take the lead in the fight against
climate change but are held back by regressive policies that force compliance with national standards that preempt state regulations. For this
reason, establishing uniform standards for fuel efficiency without a place
for state regulation has had a huge impact on states’ efforts to reduce
GHG emissions.
III. THE SAFE RULE MAY BE LEGAL BUT THAT DOESN’T MAKE IT
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND LAW
Simply put, the SAFE Rule amends CAFE by setting new standards.
The scope of this rule can be divided into three broad areas: (i) greenhouse gas emissions regulation, (ii) corporate average fuel economy regulation, and (iii) the creation of a nationalized and uniform CAFE
regulation that rescinds California’s Clean Air Act waiver.121
The reason this rule was jointly proposed by both EPA and the
NHTSA goes back to the Energy Security and Independence Act of 2007
(“EISA”),122 and the watershed case Massachusetts v. EPA that was decided that same year.123 EISA mandated the creation of CAFE standards
until the year 2030.124 EISA also called for the agencies to make a
greater effort to harmonize their distinct and independent efforts to regulate air pollution and fuel efficiency.125
Prior to 2007, the EPA was tasked with determining standards for
regulating the emission of “air pollutants” from motor vehicles under the
Clean Air Act,126 while the NHTSA was tasked with determining fuel
efficiency under the CAFE program.127 Additionally, section 209 of the
Clean Air Act allowed the EPA to grant California a waiver allowing it
to set more stringent state regulatory standards,128 which other states
could then adopt pursuant to section 177.129
119

42 U.S.C. § 7543.
42 U.S.C. § 7507.
121
SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 24,181.
122
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, § 102, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17001-17386); 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)(B).
123
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
124
EISA § 102(b)(2)(B) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)(B))
125
EISA § 102(b)(1) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(1)) (requiring DOT (NHTSA) to consult with Department of Energy and EPA prior to prescribing new CAFE standards).
126
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
127
49 U.S.C. § 32902.
128
49 U.S.C. § 7543.
129
49 U.S.C. § 7507.
120
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When the SAFE Rule is viewed against this backdrop of regulatory
history, its overall impact on the CAFE program and efforts to address
climate change can be assessed more readily. This section will consider
the implications of the SAFE Rule on both these objectives. It will also
consider how the outcome of past legal challenges to the CAFE standards might inform potential legal challenges to SAFE. Finally, this section will also evaluate possible actions that the Biden administration
could take to respond to SAFE and address climate change.
A. SAFE REVISITED: FOUR FACTORS &

THE

LITIGATION OPTION

An understanding of the legal challenges that SAFE and CAFE have
faced are crucial to evaluating and determining the efficacy of each of
these options. This begins with a recap of how CAFE works and where
some of its shortcomings lie.
Under the federal fuel economy program, Congress directs the
NHTSA and the EPA to issue CAFE ratings according to a list of four
factors: technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of
other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and
need of the U.S. to conserve fuel.130 The key to understanding these
factors is recognizing that they are aimed at conserving fuel to ween
America off of its oil dependency on foreign nations. This design reflects primarily economic concerns by weighing economic factors heavily, while ignoring associated effects, such as environmental, social, and
health costs. For example, while CAFE regulations are tasked with considering how much fuel is forecasted to cost in the next decade, little
weight is given to considering how many Americans will risk suffering
some kind of respiratory illness from increased carbon pollution resulting
from weak CAFE regulations that promote greater fuel consumption.
This illustrates that while CAFE’s purpose is laser focused on economics, its impact is felt far beyond the economy and has consequences on
the lives of all Americans. The statute implicitly relegates such impacts
to secondary status, as incidental or unrelated to the purpose of CAFE,
thus limiting the program’s usefulness as a tool for addressing climate
change and public health.
Almost from the beginning, opponents have attacked government
efforts to regulate GHG emissions. Even before this affected new CAFE
standards, opponents argued that the EPA lacked authority under the
Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions—a major byproduct of fuel
consumption—as an “air pollutant.”131 At first, the opponents of regu130
131

49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b).
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lating GHG emissions had some success in arguing that the Clean Air
Act did not encompass GHG emissions,132 however this would change
after the Supreme Court’s decision in the now famous case of Massachusetts v. EPA. 133
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court found that the administrator of
the EPA had a duty to regulate GHG emissions if these were determined
to be an “air pollutant” as defined by the Clean Air Act.134 The Court
found that EPA had determined that GHG emissions were clearly an air
pollutant that had a strong likelihood of harming the welfare of Americans in strong enough concentrations.135 Though the 5-4 decision was a
close one, the Court ultimately did not allow the EPA to disregard evidence of the harmful consequences of GHG pollution.136 The case also
established that Massachusetts, and potentially other states, had a material interest in trying to mitigate the effects of climate change where failure to do so would result in tangible harm to the state’s property.137
While critics of Massachusetts v. EPA may have worried that the majority was inappropriately taking a stance on climate change, the actual decision was narrowly tailored and only reinforced EPA’s duty to comply
with its Congressional mandate.138
After Massachusetts v. EPA, the CAFE regulatory scheme gained in
importance and power as a means to address GHG emissions. But increasing standards also placed a heavier burden on car manufacturers.139
Car manufacturers found an ally in President Trump who, in a bid to
temporarily bolster the automotive industry, issued the less stringent
SAFE standards.140 Trump’s actions were a little victory for car manufacturers, who stood to save millions of dollars in compliance costs from
new standards that were easier to meet. While the SAFE Rule may obstruct the EPA from aggressively regulating GHG emissions, it does not
thereby conflict with the four factors of the CAFE statute.
Earlier legal challenges to CAFE standards are also informative.
One of the first major legal challenges to CAFE standards was Center for
Auto Safety v. NHTSA, decided in 1986 by the United States Court of
132
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510-14 (2007) (describing EPA’s denial of petitions
to regulate GHG emissions and prior success in litigation upholding this decision).
133
Id. at 533-34.
134
Id. at 528.
135
Id. at 532.
136
Id. at 526.
137
Id. at 533-34.
138
Id. at 534-35.
139
2012 CAFE Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,624.
140
SAFE Vehicles Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174.
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Court. 141 In this case, the court
found that the NHTSA did not have to weigh consumer demand any
greater than other factors in its analysis when determining appropriate
CAFE standards.142 Notably, this decision came just two years after the
Court established Chevron deference,143 which made it more difficult for
petitioners to prevail in challenging the NHTSA’s actions. In Chevron
U.S.A. v. NRDC, the Court held that courts must defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of a statute if the intent of Congress was ambiguous in that statute.144 As a result, agencies like the NHTSA have a
great deal of authority when deciding how to interpret statutes, including
where to set the standards and how to weigh each of its statutorily mandated factors.
The NHTSA’s authority in setting CAFE standards was further
elaborated in 1990 by a subsequent case, Competitive Enterprise Institution v. NHTSA.145 In this case, appellants sought judicial review of the
agency’s decision to lower CAFE standards after Congress “set the maximum feasible standard to 28 mpg.”146 The court ruled that NHTSA acted reasonably and within its authority when it reduced the maximum
feasible standards for specific model years, and the agency’s decision to
lower the CAFE standard was not “arbitrary or capricious.”147 The court
went on to reject an additional claim brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), finding that appellants lacked standing
because the alleged environmental harm they had suffered from
NHTSA’s lowering of the standards was merely speculative.148
Competitive Enterprise and Center for Auto Safety both demonstrate that CAFE standards are difficult to challenge in light of Chevron
deference—which requires courts to grant the agencies considerable leeway in their decision-making. The fact that CAFE requires the agency to
balance many factors of a technical nature further underscores the importance of agency expertise and strengthens the rationale for deference. In
addition, balancing competing interests will almost always result in one
or more parties being unhappy with the outcome. To allow legal challenges to influence how the agency interprets its duty to make CAFE
141

Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir.

1986).
142

Id. 1338.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
144
Id.
145
Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
143

1990).
146

Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 111, 121-22.
148
Id. at 124.
147
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determinations could have profound implications on NHTSA’s authority
to make such decisions. To address this, courts must consider separation
of powers issues and refrain from intruding on the domain of the executive and legislative branches. For these reasons, there has not been a
successful challenge to CAFE regulations on the basis of how the agency
decides to balance its varied and often competing interests, even when
the CAFE standards were lowered, as with the SAFE Rule.
While Chevron deference remains an important consideration in any
judicial review of an agency action, there is an argument for a solution
on the legislative side. If Congress directed the NHTSA to consider environmental costs as a primary factor alongside other factors, then
NHTSA would have more of an incentive to do so, which could prevent
CAFE standards from backsliding and a rule like SAFE might never be
passed. As of this moment, the agency is free to revise its CAFE standards and continue to issue rules like SAFE that loosen restrictions and
take regulatory power away from the states. Under the current statute,
agency deference means that agencies like the NHTSA and the EPA
might never be compelled to issue environmentally protective CAFE
standards. A revision of the NHTSA’s congressional mandate could thus
be instrumental in requiring the agency to consider environmental and
public health consequences in future CAFE rules.
While the SAFE Rule characterizes the move to preempt the states
as a necessary step forward in ensuring CAFE compliance,149 this move
jeopardizes state autonomy in regulating GHG emissions and promoting
green technologies. The One National Program is not the first deregulatory rule of its kind. In fact, the Trump administration was marked by
an overall embrace of deregulation in the realm of environmental law.150
The reason that SAFE is uniquely in a class of its own is because in
seeking to harmonize CAFE standards it completely eliminates the regulatory power of the states to set stronger standards to protect the health
and welfare of their citizens from the adverse impacts of vehicle
emissions.
Most of the legal challenges to the SAFE Rule and the One National
Program are still in progress.151 One case that has been decided is California v. EPA, which sought to challenge the EPA’s rollback of Obama’s
149

One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,311.
See Center for Law, Energy & the Environment (CLEE), Reversing Environmental Rollbacks, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/clee/rollback-tracker/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2021).
151
See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 191230, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2019); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
No. 20-1145 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2020).
150
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2012 CAFE Rule.152 In this case, California and other states challenged
the Trump EPA’s decision to withdraw and revise the previous administration’s Midterm Determination that the 2012 Rule should remain in
effect, arguing that the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.153 Ultimately, California and the other states lost because the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the agency’s withdrawal and reopening of its prior determination did not constitute a “judicially reviewable
final action.”154 In sum, the EPA acted within its power when it reopened its determination and subsequently found that the 2012 CAFE
standards were no longer feasible.
The jury is still out on whether other recent legal challenges to the
SAFE Rule will be more successful. Because the EPA Administrator has
considerable discretion in determining whether to grant Clean Air Act
waivers,155 EPA’s decision to rescind California’s waiver could be difficult to challenge. However, there is no question that both the One National Program Rule and SAFE Rule are final agency actions, so that at
least is unlikely to be a barrier to a decision on the merits. Whatever the
outcome, it’s clear that California and the section 177 states will remain
in a precarious position, subject to the whim of a federal agency to determine their powers, even when the administration is willing to cooperate.
With a new president in office, there is some hope that the federal
government will return regulatory power to the states. For all of these
reasons, President Biden is under pressure to take action on the SAFE
Rule to address its shortcomings.
B. POTENTIAL ACTIONS
Newly elected President Biden has an opportunity to rectify some of
the outstanding issues with CAFE, such as restoring the Clean Air Act
waiver and placing stricter standards on fuel efficiency to reduce GHG
emissions. This section will outline three of the possible avenues that the
president can take: (1) President Biden can choose to do nothing and
allow the SAFE Rule to remain in place until it runs out in 2026; (2)
President Biden can overturn the SAFE Rule by enacting a new CAFE
standard while leaving the CAFE regulatory scheme mostly untouched;
or (3) President Biden can scrap the whole CAFE regulatory scheme in
favor of a new regulatory scheme.
152

California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1349.
154
Id. at 1353.
155
42 U.S.C. § 7543.
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First, if President Biden chooses to do nothing about SAFE, this
will clearly be the path of least action. Here, President Biden need not
do anything during the duration of his term as the SAFE Rule will expire
in 2026 when the last model year standard becomes obsolete.156 Proponents for this course of inaction may argue that the NHTSA and the EPA
have used their best judgement in determining feasible CAFE standards
and that a yearly increase of 1.5 MPG is reasonable. However, President
Biden would be wise to look beyond the arguments about the reasonableness of this modest increase because the One National Program’s impact
on states and the SAFE Rule’s regressive stance on climate change both
make it untenable.
Fortunately, the no action approach seems unlikely given that President Biden has already begun to take action to stay litigation in a case
challenging the SAFE Rule.157 In a recent development in a case currently before the D.C. Circuit, Competitive Enterprise Institute v.
NHTSA, the federal defendant filed and was granted motion to stay litigation to reassess its position.158 This litigation is an effort to overturn
the SAFE Rule on grounds that the agencies improperly weakened the
CAFE standards.159 Thus, it appears safe to assume that President
Biden’s administration will not simply stand back and allow the rule to
expire. If the Biden Administration’s initial action in this litigation is
any indication of what is to come, then a course of inaction in regard to
SAFE seems unlikely.
Second, the Biden administration can choose to undo SAFE while
leaving the CAFE regulatory scheme intact. Much like the EPA did with
their redetermination of the 2012 standards, President Biden’s EPA can
reverse course and reconsider the SAFE Rule. This will have additional
procedural requirements now that a final agency action has issued, but
the agency may be able to suspend the rule while it formulates a new
one.160 The automotive and fossil fuel industries will likely push back
on this course of action, as they are generally opposed to more stringent
CAFE standards and the SAFE Rule is much more favorable to car manufacturers than the previous 2012 rule.
156
49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(3)(B) (limiting particular CAFE regulations to a maximum of five
model years).
157
Thomas Richichi et. al., D.C. Circuit Stays Litigation over EPA Recission of California
Waiver to Regulate Vehicle Emissions, JDSUPRA (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/d-c-circuit-stays-litigation-over-epa-1845485/.
158
Order [Granting Motion to Hold in Abeyance], Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway
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Because CAFE is a regulatory scheme that promotes greater fuel
conservation, it necessarily militates against the consumption of fuel.
Thus, the automotive industry and other industries promoting fossil fuel
consumption will likely continue to lobby against any regulatory scheme
that takes money out of their pockets and forces compliance on them.
President Biden could also modify the One National Program to
eliminate the preemption policy but keep the joint rulemaking approach
intact. This would be more like Obama’s National Program where a unified regulatory approach was achieved by negotiating a standard that the
states and the vehicle manufacturers could all agree on.161 Recent statements by the new EPA Administrator, Michael Regan, make this approach seem quite possible.162 Regan not only endorsed consensusbuilding, but said he was “a firm believer in the state’s statutory authority to lead, in California being the leader.”163 He also indicated that the
EPA will be proposing a new CAFE Rule as early as July 2021.164 This
news appears to confirm that Biden will not allow the SAFE Rule or
preemption policy to remain in place for long.
Lastly, the most extreme course of action, and perhaps the least
plausible of President Biden’s options, involves scrapping the CAFE regulations in favor of developing another framework with Congress’s cooperation. While this may seem unlikely, former President Trump’s
efforts to roll back environmental regulations during his presidential
term165 opens up the possibility that President Biden will seek to foreclose such maneuvers by amending the statutory framework of CAFE.
While this course of action is the most work, and not without risk, there
are some arguments for a new regulatory scheme that cannot be perfunctorily dismissed.
For starters, the CAFE regulatory scheme is primarily focused on
reducing fuel consumption, but does not aim to eliminate fuel consumption altogether. This can be inferred from the fact that if fuel prices are
forecasted to fall, the CAFE factors allow for less stringent fuel economy
standards, as was the case with SAFE. Additionally, CAFE’s failure to
recognize adverse impacts on the environment sometimes puts it at odds
with efforts to mitigate climate change. As with SAFE, less stringent
161
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fuel economy standards are likely to have the secondary effect of greater
fuel consumption, and thus greater quantities of GHG emissions. The
failure of CAFE to address environmental impacts and adverse health
effects is a serious shortcoming that speaks to the possible benefit of
undertaking a whole new approach. Alternatively, an amendment to the
four factors might offer a middle ground. In sum, while this course of
action seems extreme, it is not completely out of the picture, and it is not
unthinkable that, by the end of President Biden’s term, a new regulatory
scheme could be well on its way to replacing CAFE.
Figuring out the future of CAFE is a tricky problem. On one hand,
CAFE’s laser focus on the economy makes it a useful tool for conserving
fuel and nudging car manufacturers in a more environmentally sustainable direction. On the other hand, as a regulatory scheme that does not
consider the environment as a primary factor in its analysis, CAFE can
take less stringent approaches, such as the one taken by SAFE, without
having to worry about environmental impact. Ultimately, regulating car
manufacturers, creating an environmentally sustainable America, and
balancing these two major counterpoints is an area of rulemaking that is
far too complex to be resolved by any one president or administration.
Perhaps CAFE’s issues will never be resolved, or perhaps CAFE will
give way to another regulatory scheme. What is clear is that SAFE was
not built on sound reasoning and does not agree with the values and
objectives of the NHTSA and EPA which is to promote the greatest
achievable level of fuel conservation and to protect Americans from
GHG emissions. President Biden and his administration will have to
make the tough decision of deciding whether to replace SAFE, do nothing at all, or perhaps choose a middle ground that restores the California
waiver and strengthens the standards without a major overhaul of the
whole program.
IV. CONCLUSION
The SAFE Vehicles Rule was an attempt to reconcile stringent 2012
CAFE standards with an automotive industry that did not want to face
steep compliance costs. The former presidential administration allied itself with car manufacturers and challenged the notion that the government should be involved in regulating climate change, which produced
the SAFE Rule. Now that a new president has taken office, the future of
SAFE is in serious question.
The debate over how best to regulate the automotive industry is an
important question that will not be easily resolved, nor should it be resolved by the mere election of a new president. The circumstances that
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inform CAFE regulatory decisions are constantly changing and a strong
regulatory scheme must be able to respond to an ever-adapting world.
As climate change becomes an increasingly important concern, regulatory schemes like CAFE will take on greater importance, as their outcomes not only effect economy but also the environment. Already,
CAFE is a powerful tool for encouraging car manufacturers to reduce
fuel consumption with an incidental effect of potentially promoting the
adoption of greener technologies in an effort to remain compliant. A rule
like SAFE backslides on this mission in an effort to make compliance
easier for car manufacturers, which is part of the problem. SAFE’s proponents unabashedly flaunt that it will result in greater fuel consumption,
more car sales, and more jobs in the automotive industry.166 They hardly
mention that it will result in more pollution, no autonomy for the states to
regulate emissions standards, and reduced incentives to produce more
fuel-efficient vehicles.
But the solution might not be as simple as replacing the SAFE Rule
and restoring the states’ Clean Air Act waivers. A long-term solution
could require reimagining SAFE or replacing it wholesale. Given the
back and forth, Congressional action might be needed to really solve the
problem. Whether that is possible remains to be seen.
President Biden and his team will have to weigh the benefits and
costs of replacing the SAFE Rule and how best to go about it. He should
also consult with allies in Congress and the leadership of the states.
While the best avenue forward may not be clear, it is certain is that the
future of SAFE will reveal how the United States approaches the issue of
climate change, and how far it is willing to go in ensuring a sustainable
future. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the people to ensure that
every step is taken to preserve the environment for future generations,
even if it economically disadvantages industries dependent on the consumption of fossil fuels. Economic benefits and outdated frameworks
must not stand in the way of responsibly evaluating the environmental
consequences of future CAFE standards.
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